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대학생기자단/해외상생기자단

Evaluation of the six-party talks and the German experience

 

  

Evaluation of the six-party talks and the German experience –

An interview with Dr. Koellner

 

Sven Horak, April 26th, 2009

Institute of East Asian Studies, IN-EAST (www.in-east.de)

 

 

Dr. Koellner is an acknowledged German expert on East Asian Affairs and Acting Director of the leading German Think Tank GIGA Institute of Asian Affairs located in Hamburg. Among others he is teaching at the Universities of Trier and Duisburg-Essen on North and South Korean political systems and economies. He is board member of the European Alliance for Asian Studies, Member of the scientific advisory council (Japan/Korea) of the German Association for Asian Studies and active member of international scientific networks, including the German-Korean Forum, the British Association of Korean Studies and the American Political Science Association. Dr. Koellner published numerous scientific books and articles on East Asian Affairs.

 

 

Horak: The assumption that North Korea will in no way denuclearize is unfortunate but somewhat feasible. The thereby won bargaining position is used by North Korea in order to get foreign help. As a result, North Korea receives whatever it needs to survive: foreign assistance and in addition to that, possibly self-made nuclear weapons.

How do you judge this situation concerning the six-party talks?

Is North Korea going to be the only winner in the end?

 

Dr. Koellner: No, I do not think so. In my opinion, the six-party talks aim at making an essential contribution on the path to a denuclearization of North Korea. Certainly, this is a very difficult process, and there will be obstacles in the way which will have to be removed every now and then. It is also a process that is hallmarked by persistent setbacks and following progress. Pivotal to me is the point that the six-party dialogue seems to be the only possible way to make North Korea- with the concerted efforts among relevant counties bear to substantial responsibilities.

 

 

Horak: Would you generally denote the six-party talks as being a success or a failure? How do you evaluate the future of the six-party talks in view of a development to a multilateral forum, following the example of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)?

 

Dr. Koellner: I think that the six-party talks indeed have provided important momentums, especially after the unfortunate ending of the agreement between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) and North Korea, which dealt with the denuclearisation but above all was about the weapon-based plutonium program. After this dialogue was over, the six-party talks helped to fill the vacuum and contributed to return to the status quo, to resume the discussion and thus to carefully regain control over the plutonium-based atomic program of North Korea.

Nonetheless, it is not an absolute success since the denuclearisation of North Korea could not be accomplished. Especially in the domain of verification there are unsettled questions; anyway, the fact that a process could have been started and the fact that it was possible to bring the program under international control by which first progress was achieved, is a crucial success of the six-party talks. One should take care not to impose absolute standards to the success of the six-party talks. Generally spoken, this is a process that is valued by being a process per se in order to continuously bring all the relevant agents together as well as to achieve a coordinate proceeding as good as possible. As a matter of fact I find the six-party talks very expedient.

One can also relate to a number of achievements. Nonetheless, we have not succeeded yet. Hopefully, North Korea changes its mind and resumes the six-party talks since the purely bilateral conversational channels, which could work as an alternative, would only be a suboptimal solution. Whether the six-party talks can develop to something like the CSCE for Asia must be awaited. Personally, I am very sceptical concerning this because the framework conditions that contributed to the emergence of the CSCE historically and institutionally are not present in the Northeast-Asian context. The CSCE-process was dependent on a number of preconditions which in my opinion are not given in Asia.

 

 

Horak: In December 2008 North Korea rejected the dialogue with the South and threatened the South with a military strike of demolition. Talks with Korean as well as foreign representatives of economy often make clear that the North Korean aggressive rhetoric is not taken seriously at all. Are the threats of a war on the part of North Korea really of no relevance? Why is this behaviour not ignored on the political stage as well?

 

Dr Koellner: North Korea’s persistent threatening gestures are not meaningless but all involved agents are not interested in playing these respective comments up and thereby playing into North Korea’s hands. However, there has been deterioration in perception taking place concerning the use of threatening gestures and provocative vocabulary. People involved just got used to it meanwhile. Of course one is aware of the actual danger that is coming from North Korea in the form of, for instance the powerful number of the military by headcount, above all their artillery. Therefore, one cannot be casual about the menace coming from North Korea. On the contrary, one must not react with doing useless things for the sake of just doing something in order to react to the verbal threats, and thus playing into North Korea’s hands.

 

 

Horak: Both Germany and Korea share the experience of being separated. Meanwhile the Republic of Germany is reunified, Korea is not. MdB (Member of Bundestag) Koschyk sees Germany on Korea’s path to a reunification rather in the role of the “honest counsellor” than in taking the part of a mediator.

What can Germany contribute to the Korean process of reunification? Which part can it take?

 

Dr. Koellner: Germany is not in the position of taking the part of a negotiator between the two Koreas. But Germany can support in many respects. For instance it can use its contacts in North Korea, as limited as they may be in order to create communication channels by which the North could be provided with information on global politics and global economics. This can advance a realistic understanding of actual developments as well as their realistic interpretation. Surely, South Korea can draw lessons from the German reunification process in many sectors. For example concerning questions of how to deal with the land reform or regarding the restitution of ownership structures. Moreover, there are questions relating to the reintegration of the North Korean army into a complete army. Hence, they can do so with a number of technical questions.

Furthermore, the negative lessons Germany drew from the process of reunification can also be interesting for Korea. Here, a concise example is the question of the monetary reform, the undertaking of the currency reform after the reunification. Insofar there are plenty of relevant examples. Of course, the German reunification cannot serve as a blueprint for the Korean reunification. For that, the political, economic, social and psychological conditions in both cases are much too different. Not only the economic but also the psychological slope between both parts of Korea is considerably larger and goes more downhill than that between the BRD and the former GDR. Another difference is that Germany already had a sophisticated net of social security when the reunification took place, which also contributed to the fact that far too tremendous waves of migration from the East of Germany did not occur. Such a system of similar dimensions is also missing in South Korea. These are only several examples which nonetheless indicate that the framework conditions are pretty different. One must always be aware of that and than take a look at the fields and domains where the German case provides illustrative precedents how to proceed in case of a reunification or how not to proceed.

 

Horak: 감사합니다 and thank you very much for this interview, Dr Koellner.