Conference Report:
The Obama Administration and U.S.-ROK Relations
KINU / U.S. Institute of Peace
By Shinae Hong
The U.S. Institute of Peace and the Korea Institute for National Unification co-sponsored a major conference in Washington D.C. on April 14, 2009 to discuss key issues faced by the two new administrations in their respective and joint dealings North Korea. Highly regarded North Korea experts from South Korea and the United States gathered at USIP’s Peace Room for the joint conference. Dr. Suh Jae Jean, President of the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU) arrived in Washington D.C. with three other KINU scholars. From the American side, Katy Oh, Peter Beck, Victor Cha, Scott Sndyer, Bruce Klingner, and John Park participated. This report serves as a brief overview of each panel and plenary presentation of the day’s event.
Session 1: The New Administration and ROK-U.S. Relations toward North Korea: Strategy and Measures
U.S. Presenter: Scott Snyder, Asia Foundation
ROK Presenter: CHO Min, KINU
Main Issues:
A substantial part of these two presentations were devoted to laying out coherent goals and approaches for ROK- U.S policy toward North Korea, and whether or not they are compatible. Scott Snyder suggested that although the Obama administration’s North Korean policy is still in its early stage of formation, there have already been key developments influencing American policy. To name a few:
* Secretary Clinton’s visit to Asia to assure the partnership with allies;
* Appointment of Ambassador Bosworth to enhance engagement with North Korea; and
* President Obama’s setting a clear tone for non-proliferation during the North Korean missile tests.
Scott also pointed out that there are some potential tensions evidenced in the Obama administration’s policy toward North Korea including: maintaining a balance between six-party talks and bilateral U.S.-North Korea engagement; weighing the need for toughness on proliferation with the call for more engagement; and the efficacy of Ambassador Bosworth’s apparent part-time commitment to manage America’s North Korea policy. Scott went on to say that the principles of the Obama administration’s North Korean policy, however, will likely strengthen the alliance’s coordination with South Korea and Japan, while limiting the potential of proliferation in North Korea.
Dr. Cho Min spoke on the key objectives he sees for the Lee Myoung-bak administration’s North Korea policy, and on South Korea’s expectations of the Obama administration regarding North Korea. Min noted that ROK’s core concern is North Korea’s denuclearization. He believes there should be “a concrete road-map and measures” in place to guide negotiations if North Korea abandons nuclear weapons. Dr.Cho believes that the U.S. should deal with North Korea by tackling the root causes of tensions, rather than dealing with impending issues such as nuclear and missile tests. In this regard, Dr. Cho provided a list of actions that the Obama administration should take in response to the ROK’s expectations to develop an effective joint North Korea policy.
* Developing more effective policies to help normalize the North Korea state;
* Providing assistance to develop a light water reactor to lessen North Korea’s energy shortage;
* Setting up a Washington-Pyongyang liaison office in North Korea in the Seoul-Pyongyang office;
* Developing a U.S.-ROK consultation channel for a peaceful Korean peninsula; and
* Supporting peaceful unification of the two Koreas by taking part in collaborative measures.
Session 2: Assessing Regime Stability in North Korea
U.S. Presenter: Mike Finnegan, National Bureau for Asian Research
ROK Presenter: Park Hyeong Jung, KINU
Main Issues:
Mike Finnegan asserted that North Korea shows signs of stability as its government apparatus begins to function as it is supposed to. Mike cited that Kim Jong-il still holds power over the party and military, and even though there are increasing numbers of North Korean refugees crossing the border—the border, nonetheless, is still tightly controlled. He believes Kim Jong-il now feels confident enough to start a market economic system. However, he also emphasized that under certain circumstances, the North fears instability reaching a tipping point should a leadership competition begin in the North, or as likewise North Korea fears, an opening up to the outside world would possibly lead to civil unrest.
Dr. Park, Hyeong Jung of KINU, took a more comprehensive view of the internal change he sees in North Korea stating that “regime stability should be understood as a dynamic open ended process.” Dr. Park noted in order to understand the (in)stability of North Korea, it is critical to also understand what constitutes the power of North Korea. He listed four major components for North Korean (in)stability namely: Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority; available resources for regime maintenance; Kim Jong Il’s control over resource allocation; and the regime’s ability to maintain its supremacy in the society. However, by the same token, Dr.Park asserted that North Korea faces major challenges in these areas. First, connected to Kim Jong-il’s health, there is potential for competition in power succession. Second, the regime-society relationship has rapidly deteriorated in recent years. The North Korean regime has even faced difficulties in obtaining enough resources to maintain itself. Third, Kim Jong Il has faced challenges in his resource allocation power due to resource competition among organizations in the party, military and security police of North Korea. Lastly, he concluded with a thought that the future (in)stability of North Korea will have a lot to do with how much China continues to subsidize North Korea, as well as changes within the North Korean society.
Session 3: ROK-U.S. Policy Cooperation — Bilateral, Trilateral and Multilateral Contexts
U.S. Presenter: James Przystup, National Defense University
ROK Presenter: Park Young Ho, KINU
Main Issues:
Dr. James Przystup expressed great concern in his talk on current structural problems inherent in the six-party talks due to internal differences and priorities among party members. For example, he suggested that today while the U.S. and ROK regard denuclearization as a top priority, Japan continues to focus on the issues of abductees, even though at its strategic level it seems to understand the importance of the nuclear problem. Likewise, he noted that even though the U.S. has wanted China to play a larger role in pressuring North Korea, China’s s first and foremost goal seems to be to stabilize North Korea. Dealing with North Korea, the U.S. feels there is a complete lack of trust in its negotiations. Nonetheless, James believes that a U.S.-ROK bilateral coordination, as well as a trilateral cooperation with Japan is important in dealing with North Korea. He suggested that the U.S. should keep its options open for North Korea to come back to talks when it is ready; but also not to reward its bad behavior with other carrots. He also suggested that the U.S. should not ignore North Korea which would cause it to take more provocative actions. James concluded with an emphasis on the importance of developing contingency plans as North Korea goes through a restructuring succession. In summarizing his address, James said, “We all know the contingency is out there. We face a very wide range of problems: breakdown of international order, internal order, refugees, dealing with disarming the Korean People’s Army, others securing WMD’s. However, we have to deal these very complex issues with a ‘whole government approach’. It is important to get ahead of the curve before the reality catches up with you.”
Dr. Park Young Ho presented the differences in goals and approaches in the Lee administration’s North Korea policy. The Lee administration has made it clear that the ROK would like to see a changing North Korean society. The ROK believes, unless there are changes in the North Korean society, genuine improved inter- Korean relations is nearly impossible. Because of this firm belief in the necessity for North Korean society changes, the ROK does not feel intimated by the deteriorated inter- Korean relationship. The ROK also believes that North Korea should adopt open-market reforms to encourage mass inter- Korean economic cooperation. Third, likewise, the ROK believes that in order to open dialogue with North Korea, other issues, such as non-proliferation, should be pursued in parallel with open market reforms and economic cooperation. In regard to the six party talks, Young Ho acknowledged that tension has developed in the talks due to different policy priorities among members. Nonetheless, he emphasized that it is critical for the six party members to work together focusing on the common denominator of interest. Young Ho also made the sobering point that six party members should begin to anticipate the course of action required in the case of a nuclear armed North Korea, even though that would be the least desirable option chosen by all six party members. Young Ho concluded his remarks by sharing his view of the ROK’s expectations of an Obama administration with respect to North Korea. The ROK would like to receive support from the U.S. to improve bilateral and trilateral relations with its regional allies – Japan and China. Further, the ROK desires the U.S. to become more active in facilitating improved inter-Korean relations, as well as to be more supportive in achieving the goal of unification of the two Koreas.
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