Joint Conference Report on Premier Wen's Pyongyang Visit

Joint Conference Report on:

PREMIER WEN'S PYONGYANG VISIT---WHAT ARE THE

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NORTH KOREA POLICY?

KEI / U.S. Institute of Peace

 

By Shinae Hong

 

When China’s Premier Wen Jiabao made a three-day unprecedented trip to North Korea in October, taking along a large, high ranking delegation including his foreign minister, the world’s focus was stirred.  What effect would China ’s renewed promise to strengthen Kim Jong-il’s regime have on further negotiations at a time when North Korea ’s appeared vulnerable to financial sanctions?  In this light, what is the impact of Premier Wen's visit on U.S. North Korea policy?   Korea experts, Dr. Jonathan Pollack and Dr. John Park from the United States discussed these questions in a joint USIP-KEI event taking place at KEI's conference facilities in Washington D.C. on October 14, 2009.

 

Introduction of speakers: 

 

Jack Pritchard, (President, KEI) opened the panel discussion with an introductory statement setting the tone of the discussion:  “I was struck by a statement that was made after the visit attributed to the Chinese Foreign Minister where he was quoted as saying, “Wen Jiabao’s visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is rich in content, weighty in outcome, and significant in meaning.”  “Well, we will find out if this is at all true or not.”

 

 

 Panel Speaker 1:  Dr. Jonathan Pollack ( U.S. Naval War College )

 

Dr. Jonathan Pollack addressed the conference summarizing the significance of Premier Wen’s visit to Pyongyang in October by offering his conclusions to five key questions he posed at the start of his talk including:

  

Ø      Key Question #1:  What is the significance of the visit?

 

Key Point(s):

·         Party and the Workers Party of Korea .

·         China is the only nation with any significant access to the North Korean regime and is also the first Chinese Prime Minister to visit in 4 years.

 

Key Conclusion(s):  The aid given by the Chinese shows that there has been a new initiative begun by the Chinese despite major disappointments.”  However, China undertaking new economic assistance to North Korea has context and implication with the current North Korea negotiation process.   The aid may still be within the Spirit of UN Sanction 1874 because sanctions were silent on humanitarian aid.

 

 

Ø      Key Question #2:  What else has changed to bring about the Chinese initiative?

 

Key Point(s):

·         End of North Korea economic experiments and effort of North Korea to re-centralize their economic decision making process and their economic mobilization campaign started.

·         Missile and nuclear tests triggering some very intense debate within China among policy makers about the cost and liabilities that China has incurred with respect to North Korea . 

·         China has taken on at least 70% of the 2-way trade between the two and dependency on China by North Korea .  What it has not led to, at least in the upper policy level, is comparable leverage or influence over North Korea behavior by China .

·         More recently there has been very strained relationships between North Korea and Japan and some big peaks and bigger valleys with the South Korean relationship; and in 2007-2008 period; a shift in the diplomacy level between the US and North Korea.  In addition, Kim Jung-il’s stroke and his seemingly recovery, and the underscoring of the uncertainty among policy makers in terms of succession problems, was problematic for the Chinese. 

 

Key Conclusion(s):  Current succession uncertainty in North Korea was highlighted as a prime motivator in China ’s initiative rather than waiting on pending diplomacy. 

 

 Ø      Key Question(s)# 3:  What does Beijing know that we don’t?  Why have they chosen to offer aid at this time?   Is there a different calculus here?  Are they getting a return for all they are putting in? 

 

Key Point(s):

·         Dr. Pollack implied the Chinese are frustrated that we (5 parties) are engaged in deliberations about North Korea but not engaged in negotiations with North Korea .

·         The Chinese position is that the North Korea are saying the right things again.

·         The Chinese emphasize this opportunity could be gone quickly if we do not aggressively follow through with bilateral negotiations.

 

Key Conclusion: A general opinion was stated by Dr. Pollack that Premier Wen is trying to reapply an older diplomacy to somehow to coax the U.S. in direct contact or negotiation with North Korea to keep the process going even if it does not proceed toward a satisfactory outcome.

 

Ø      Key Question #4:  What are North Korea ’s Expectations?

 

Key Point(s):

·         In Dr. Pollack’s view one of the most critical mistakes Kim Jung-il made over the past year was he took President’s Obama’s campaign rhetoric too seriously, assuming in light of 2006, during the first nuclear test, he might be successful in repeating bilateral negotiations between the North Korea and the US. 

·         He suggested North Korea has made a judgment it has recalibrated the negotiating playing field and is now to be treated as a state in possession nuclear weapons.  Therefore, he also suggests the North Korea ’s view the agreement signed in Beijing in the six-party talks, was in essence a dead letter agreement.

 

Key Conclusion(s): The bilateral agreement is now the focus of North Korea in diplomatic negotiation with other nations. 

 

Ø      Key Question#5:  What are the United States ’ Expectations?

 

Key Point(s): 

·         Steven Bosworth will pay North Korea another visit soon.

·         The U.S. administration is very clear on its stated set of expectations 1) North Korea will recommit to the goals of statements made in context with the 6- party talks; 2) North Korea must demonstrate irreversible evidence there is denuclearization going on; and  3) North Korea forgoes its status as a Nuclear Weapons state. 

·         There is a coalition of states that seems to be speaking a common voice.  And the U.S. is trying to develop a consensus with defections from that coalition. 

·         There have been other statements that the administration is not agreeable to go back to business as usual, but is willing to seize this moment in time to use a very different approach. 

·         If North Korea current strategy is a tactical reset and there is no intent to agree to those already agreed upon, then sanctions will continue to ostracize North Korea .

 

Key Conclusion :  Do we now try to cope with a Nuclear Armed North Korea in a series of bilateral agreements or, if not, where will it take us?  Can China and the U.S. find a way to navigate that path to mutual peaceful resolutions?

Panel Speaker 2:  Dr. John Park (USIP, Washington D.C. )

 

Dr. John Park presented a culmination of his research conducted on the policy approaches used by various countries dealing with North Korea , including: 

 

Part 1:  Focus on the relationship of Communist Party of China and North Korea Workers Party;

Part 2:  Focus on China Inc dealing with North Korea Inc.; and

Part 3:  Implications for China and for the U.S. in its North Korean policy

 

Part 1:  Relationship of the Communist Party of China to the Workers Party of North Korea

Dr. Park began his presentation with historical accounts of the relationship the Chinese Communist Party has had with the Workers Party of Korea.  Pointing out critical periods of the relationship and the importance of that history related, he related it to China ’s access to North Korea today and the bilateral accord signed in October.

 

October 1949- Communist Party of China and Workers Party of Korea first formed a formal relationship…(a channel that has endured over the most difficult times, even throughout the period that North Korea played China off the Soviet Union ). 

 

August 1992-China and South Korea recognized each other diplomatically...an effort by South Korea to rebalance the power dynamics on the Korean peninsula; a period seen where North Korea felt betrayed and was without a comprehensive relationship with other nations.  It was also the period when North Korea chose to begin developing its own nuclear deterrent;

 

October 2005 Period:  Landmark relationship between the Communist Party of China and of Workers Party of Korea, where Vice Premier Hu delegation committed to rebuild North Korean infrastructure.  

 

            Events of October 2009:

Premier Wen attended the 60^th anniversary of bi-lateral relations between Communist Party and the Workers Party of Korea.  This was an unprecedented meeting attended by the Chinese Commerce Secretary Chen, China’s chief economic planner, and various military high ranking officials with the goal to reestablish the joint comprehensive relationship and a new commercial agreement between China and North Korea.

 

Part2:  China Inc. engages North Korea Inc

Park held out the sub-context for the meeting between Beijing and Pyongyang was not only to supply emergency aid and economic subsidy to shore up the Kim Jong-il regime, but also to enter into a joint development project with North Korea developing massive deposits of iron ore and energy (coal) resources located in Hamgyong Provence.  Park suggested, from the Chinese perspective, “the natural resources are vital to the continued economic development of three adjacent Chinese provinces bordering North Korea .”  Park reemphasized, that the “enabler for the agreement was not the relationship with the North Korean military or the Kim Jung-il regime, but it was the relationship of the Communist Party of China with the Workers Party of Korea.”

 

Symbolism and Objectives of Meeting:

Dr. Park highlighted the symbolism used in the meeting with Premier Wen and North Korea to focus on China ’s use of its communist party to communist party connection in North Korea to strengthen its commercial relationship with North Korea .  Park pointed out because Premier Wen’s delegation had the key objective of broadening the commercial bond between the parties, the symbolism was highly visible and highlighted by:

 

·         The makeup of the Chinese delegation including the highest ranking officials in the government 

(Park said “ China could have gone with a much smaller delegation.  This is a very strong message sent by China to North Korea , going beyond the 6 party talks.  Those are important to China , but in a bilateral sense, the deepening of the commercialization is a very important step.”) 

 

·         Another symbol in the picture was Premier Wen wearing and displaying the red scarf of the communist party as he attended the boulevard parade in Pyongyang dressed in full party regalia.  “This was something not missed on both sides of the boarder,” said Park.

 

Part 3:  Implications for China and for U.S. Policy toward North Korea

With respect to China, Dr. Park saw the accord representing a massive political investment in the future generations of the Korean Workers Party, and also noted that even though the Kim Jung-il regime is not a popular idea in China to support a third generation ruler like Kim, “it would be very important for China policy makers to frame that person as head of the Workers Party for North Korea..”

 

The other point Park made from China’s perspective was, due to the uncertainty in the leadership succession in North Korea now, and the existing high potential for economic development and prosperity in the area coming from the natural resources, China’s commercial investment would be “prudent to deepen the party to party relationship now between North Korea and China helping it become stronger over time.”

 

Lastly, with respect to linkage of commercial aid from China to North Korea for purposes of denuclearization, Park suggested that it has never been officially stated by Beijing that if North Korea does not denuclearize they will withdraw from these developments.  “However, there is clearly a long-standing policy of a two track approach by Beijing pushing the talks to move down the path of implementing the agreement.”  He suggested, the Chinese would likely leave it up to North Korea how deeply and to what scale it would choose to engage.

 

In Park’s opinion, when it comes to the implications of China bailing out of North Korea , he suggested it would “eventually lead North Korea to be much more willing to be engaged in other bilateral talks.”  He also implied if North Korea felt certain [within a bilateral relationship] a nation has its back, and it can exert some control over that bilateral relationship, you could see North Korea reaching out more coming in line with normal expectations.  Park said, you would also notice China developing and deepening their commercial bilateral approach in dealing with North Korea , while it still pushes forward with an agenda of denuclearization.

 

However, with respect to denuclearization, Park pointed out that Washington is very adamant that denuclearization come first, a diametrically opposed tenant for both countries.  Park gave an overview of the conditions that Washington is supporting now: 

 

1)      North Korea has to come back to the 6-party talks; 

2)      Any bilateral talks have to take place in context of the 6 party talks;

3)      Evidence of denuclearization has to be irreversible;

4)      North Korea must give up it rights to nuclear weapons; and

5)      If North Korea continues to fail to honor those demands, then the U.S. would seek the support of the allied parties to force the issue and continue bringing international collective pressure to show North Korea it would continue to have a bleak future to show it would continue to be ostracized.

 

Dr. Park’s personal opinion for the hope North Korea would come to its senses and come back to the six-party talks is not realistic because, as the accord signed by each party stated, nations would be encouraged to deal directly with North Korea in bi-lateral agreements in line with the principles of the accord.  Park then raised the question, “Why go back and renegotiate that agreement.” 

 

Likely Scenarios and Implications:

 

Dr. Park suggested various likely scenarios for events in Northeast Asia when dealing with North Korea in the future.  These appeared in matrix-form and included the following possibilities (in Dr. Park’s words):

 

1)      “If North Korea continues to stay away from the 6-party talks, but it doesn’t do anything major in the North Korean incorporation area, North Korea could become like a Cuba .  That is, having sanctions placed upon it from the U.S. but at the same time enjoying normal trade relationships with many other countries.  That is a situation that could last for a while, particularly with it developing a series of bilateral relationships with various nations.”

 

2)      “Another possibility is the less proliferation activity and more 6- party talks going forward with verifiable denuclearization activities. (However, many people see this option as less likely now because North Korea is quite firm in insisting nuclear arms reduction control talks go forward.  It is very different now as North Korea sees its nuclear deterrent as a baseline.” 

 

3)      “If North Korea joins the 6-party talks again, but there is more proliferations, we will most likely see more bad behavior because, as we have seen in the past U.S. administrations as they have ended their term in office, in the year they have gone out of office, there is the hope that they can get things going again but North Korea repositions itself to again take advantage of perceived weakness.” 

 

4)      “The last scenario would be with more proliferation activity, you may see less willingness of the multilateral negotiations, in which case we would see more financial sanctions and have the possibility of a situational continuance of the NE Asia problem.” 

 

Dr. Park concluded his talk noting that there are likely to soon be announcements of new deals of joint development between China and North Korea of those natural resources… he said, “however, we shouldn’t be surprised with China pushing forward its national interests with joint development of these natural resources, especially in these energy areas crucial to the economic development of the provinces in China.”  He also questioned how the U.S. will structure its sanctions in light of the deepening relationship between North Korea and China as evidenced by this new comprehensive relationship?