The Korean-German relations and Germany’s special role in the Korean reunification process
2009 is a year of exceptional significance for Korea and Germany. This year, both countries celebrate their official relations that have been lasting for 125 years.
Officially starting on November 29th 1883 with a mutual contract on friendship, trade and shipment, the Korean and German relations have developed and have deepened continuously. Today, Korea is Germany’s major trading partner in Asia and Germany is Korea’s most important partner in Europe with a trading volume of more than USD 25 Billion (2007) and accounting for almost a third of the entire trade volume between Korea and the European Union. The traded goods of both countries are on a high technological level. Both countries are important investors and employers in the respective partner country.
Four countries – Three relations
Especially, after World War II Germany intensified its relations to the Republic of Korea whereby the relationship between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) developed in parallel. Those days, four separate countries had to manage three relations each. An experience just a few countries in the world undergo. For the DPRK, the most imporant partner within the Eastern bloc was the GDR with which it developed official relations in 1949.
After the reunification, Germany and the DPRK established official relations in 2001. According to the mutual agreement, the diplomatic relations pertain the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, progress in the inner-Korean dialogue and the improvement of the human rights situation in the DPRK. At present, the political dialogue focuses in particular on the North Korean nuclear weapons program and the weak progress of human rights issues in the North. An important role in the bilateral relations played the German humanitarian assistance over the last years, which includes financial support and efforts from official and private German humanitarian organizations, aiming to improve insufficient food supply of the North Korean population.
From a German point of view it is quite impressing to find many personalities in the DPRK that speak German. These skills were acquired during advanced trainings which were received in the GDR. Today, these personalities can be found in state enterprises, among parliament members or in public administration. This is also a heritage of the relation between Germany and Korea.
In the history of the partnership both countries experienced enrichment in both ways. German merchants, diplomats, the Benedictine order, and people from the cultural sector entered Korea early, so did miners and nurses in Germany playing a crucial and enriching role. Since Germany has been reunified for more than a decade it is for Korea of interest to see what its partner and friend in Europe for 125 years now has experienced on the way to a German reunification.
“Ostpolitik” and the CSCE
Two items shall be stressed here that contributed in Germany to changes during the cold war. It is the “Ostpolitik” of Willy Brandt including the important features of rapprochement and integration.
Egon Bahr, who served from 1969-1972 under Willy Brandt as Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, can be regarded as being the creator of the German “Ostpolitik”. In 1963 he presented the concept of “change through rapprochement”. Therewith he recommended to give up the policy of power-politics. According to his understanding, formal agreements and condition-based politics are no longer suitable tools to enable a unification. A change can be brought about by extending the frame of communication to a European level that also includes the Soviet Union, in order to weaken the existential fear of the GDR. Following the ideas of Egon Bahr, other German politicians caught up on this approach by understanding that a German unification can only be realized in the frame of a general European piece framework. Treaties on renunciation from military force followed with the Soviet Union and other East European states. In 1968 the GDR in this context was officially approached and included in the talks. These new developments on the political stage were recognised by the German public and generated a new attitude about the relationship with the East German neighbours. The points of view became increasingly pragmatic.
In the consequence of several separate treaties between the European states, the desire for a closer cooperation within Europe emerged. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) served as a forum for multilateral talks starting in 1973. It was the first conference of which the world’s largest intergovernmental organization in terms of security orientation finally emerged: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In 1975 the Helsinki declaration was signed by the participating states concluding a closer cooperation in the area of economic questions, science, environment, humanitarian affairs and security. Initially, the Helsinki declaration was regarded as being the most beneficial for the Eastern bloc states, since therewith their borders were officially approved and further economic activity with the West was expected. In addition to this, each state committed not to engage in the other states’ internal affairs. Nonetheless, the declaration also included commitments on human rights on which especially the Eastern bloc states made concessions. The domestic civic rights movement could hence refer legally to the agreements of the Helsinki declaration.
The CSCE, the six party talks and the role of Germany
The six party talks including Russia, USA, Japan, China, South Korea and North Korea, were introduced when concerns on security in North Eastern Asia arose due to the North Korean nuclear weapons program in 2003. The latest status of the talks is that China is possibly willing to disconnect the talks from the nuclear weapons issue and wants to develop the six party talks to a permanent multilateral dialog. Here, a parallel can be found between the development of the CSCE process and the six party talks. In September 2008 MP Hartmut Koschyk reports in an interview with n-tv that “The Chinese are open-minded towards such thoughts and study the Helsinki process closely”. The role Germany can play is seen rather as being an “honest counsellor” than a mediator. What does “honest counsellor” mean? Germany has experiences with the East-West confrontation and how to overcome it by confidence-building measurements such as the CSCE process. Taking the role of Korea’s “honest counsellor” can be regarded as fulfilling a historic duty to share these experiences and contribute to a reunification on the Korean peninsula in the background of 125 years of official relationship.
Conclusion
This essay outlines the special relationship between the former two Germanys and the two parts of Korea in the background of their 125 years lasting official relationship. It argues that Germany’s experiences with its own reunification can be of inspiring value in the process of reunification in Korea. Germany pursued the way of the so-called “Ostpolitik” under Willy Brandt including the main features of rapprochement and integration, which turned out to be successful in the end. Egon Bahr, the creator of the “Ostpolitik” understood the zeitgeist of the late sixties and early seventies well, which enabled him to pursue new political ways. However, there is no standard formula for a successful reunification that fits for all countries. Korea needs to find its individual approach in order to achieve a successful reunification. Since historical developments, economic standards, population ratio, inner political affairs, geopolitical aspects and several other items are quite different compared to Germany in the eighties and Korea these days, a one-to-one takeover of the German model of reunification is difficult to imagine and surely not recommendable. However, there are several aspects that might be quite inspiring for Korea. For example the impact of the CSCE that caused a major impulse towards reunification, or growing cooperation on a wide range of common challenges with other countries in the region, among others, issues of trade and human rights.
Due to the differences mentioned above, Germany is not in the position to support Korea in a role of an active mediator. Due to the experiences made before and after the German reunification, regardless whether they were good or bad, Germany can be a valuable partner for Korea, taking over the role rather as an “honest counsellor” instead of a proactive mediator on the way to a Korean reunification.
References:
Koschyk, H., 2008. Die deutsch-koreanischen Beziehungen dynamisch fortentwickeln (engl.: Developing the German-Korean relations dynamically forward). Speech at the Bundestag. December 19th, 2008. www.korea-dkg.de.
Koschyk, H. (Ed.), 2005. Deutschland, Korea – Geteilt, vereint (engl.: Germany, Korea – Divided, united). Olzog Verlag. München. 2005.
Koschyk, H., 2008. Nordkorea im Umbruch. Militär-Junta möglich (engl.: North Korea in transition. Military junta possible). Interview with Till Schwarze/ N-TV, September 12th, 2008. http://www.n-tv.de/1022492.html
