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The North Korean Nuclear Crisis

 

The North Korean Nuclear Crisis

 

 

By Shinae Hong (shinae810@yahoo.com)

Washington D.C. May 27, 2009

 

The Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion on the North Korean crisis and its implications for the region and the United States. Richard Bush, senior fellow and director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research for the 21st Century Defense Initiative, and Dennis Wilder, visiting fellow with the John K. Thornton China Center, provided their analyses of the current state of affairs in North Korea.

 

Richard Bush suggested three factors driving the current crisis despite Obama’s ‘open mind' toward North Korea. First, North Korea has a “constant desire to set the negotiation table favorable to its own interest because it is a weak power, and has engaged in brinkmanship and provocation to set the bargaining agenda.” Bush elaborated on by suggesting that North Korea perhaps sees the value of non-negotiation by setting the bar high to make it difficult. Secondly, from North Korea’s standpoint, Bush stated “the North’s nuclear weapon capability is actually their ideal deterrent against stronger powers, despite the apparent credibility of the weapon.” He suggested that is why they need to test it, to demonstrate that they can strike harm on other countries like the U.S. and Japan. The third factor justifying this course of behavior, according to Dr. Bush, is induced by the internal instability of the political succession crisis in Pyongyang. Bush believes that Kim Jong Il has a rule of supporting military; therefore, testing missiles and nuclear devices is an effective way of cultivating needed military support. Albeit, Bush doubts whether there will be much change in North Korea’s position to keep the military weapon until new leadership is established in Pyongyang. He placed an emphasis on keeping the framework of multilateral approaches in dealing with North Korea’s provocation.

 

Michael O’Hanlon dealt with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) South Korea recently joined which has brought strong reaction from North Korea. O’Hanlon said, “PSI is not intended to be overly assertive behavior of an act of war as North Korea claims because PSI’s concept itself is fairly minimal. He added, “PSI only coordinates what the normal international pattern of behavior follows when inspecting a ship crossing into another’s territorial water. If we have a good reason to believe that a ship carries a weapon then, under the article 51 of UN charter, we can exercise self-defense to stop the ship without a permit from a country.” Thus, O’Hanlon’s reasoning was that South Korea’s recent joining of PSI was not provocative because it has a legitimate reason to worry about North Korea.  However, O’Hanlon asserted there is a point which raises the question of a possible military action when it comes to the “actual physical act of search” of a vessel presumed to have plutonium. Then, in practice, O’Hanlon said, “maintaining surveillance of 2,500 kilometers of North Korean coast line, using 8 to12 orbits of aircraft, and then being able to back up those aircraft, and stop North Korean ship if necessary, can become a doable military mission. Considering North Korea’s behavior, this action could become much more worrisome.”

 

Based on the issues of proliferation of nuclear materials, O’Hanlon believes that North Korea does not have enough capability of “delivering” the weapon. He suggested, “putting a nuclear weapon on a missile and allowing it to survive atmosphere entry is no trivial matter, but requires advanced technology which North Korea presumably does not have yet. There is very decent chance that either the missile will fall off course in the air or we would be able to shoot it down in advance.” 

 

Dennis Wilder suggested although many of Northeast Asia experts and watchers believe China has not taken a lead role in dealing with North Korea, he thinks China still has a  key leverage because of its close economic and political ties with North Korea. In January, China sent the head of its international liaison department to North Korea to mark China-North Korea friendship. Wilder noted “it was Kim’s first and only appearance we have seen with an international visitor. North Korea is highly dependent on the Chinese’s banking system and cross boarder trade.  Wilder further asserted “the recent nuclear test, apparently a more successful one, may alter the Chinese calculus on not pressuring Kim Jong Il too hard because of the Chinese’s desire for stability is along the line with nuclear free Northeast Asia.”

  

Wilder suggested that what U.S. can do is to get China to live up to its commitment made under the U.N. Security Council  resolution 1718. China, along with the international community, agreed to work together to put pressure on North Korea to alter its course and come back to the negotiating table.  Wilder remarked “how China deals with North Korea can also be a good indicator of what kind of great power China is becoming in Northeast Asia.”

 

All panelists agreed that North Korea is offered a chance for normalization with the United States, and economic aid is also on the table in return for verifiably dismantling its nuclear weapons capacity—North Korea understands this deal well. Sending a U.S. high level envoy to discuss the substance of the nuclear question is seen as appropriate only after North Korea reengaging the process of negotiation. The consensus at the meeting was that North Korea should change its course to work with other parties.